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Abstract: 
   
Purpose: The aim of the article is to present the author’s methodological proposal in the 
field of management and development planning, taking the opinions of the commune 
inhabitants. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The statistical population of the study has included all 
listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. After sampling 141 companies were studied 
using data from 2011 to 2018 using the multiple regression method.   
Findings: The results show that there was a significant relationship between investment 
efficiency and audit fee, and financial distress had a significant effect on the relationship 
between investment efficiency and audit fee. 
Practical Implications: The managers working in Iran have greater confidence than firms to 
use auditors who receives less audit fee and the companies in a climate of financial distress 
have overconfident managers. 
Originality/Value: Since no empirical research has been conducted to study the 
aforementioned variables in Iran, the present study is innovative in this respect. Also the 
results are also applicable to other underdeveloped countries in the Middle East. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Pricing audit services is one of the subjects of interest to many audit scholars; so far, 
many studies have been done in this area, some of which are mentioned in the 
research background. Although the research methodologies used in these studies are 
somewhat different, most of them pursue a major goal, which is to identify the 
factors affecting audit fee. Knowing these factors is beneficial for both the client and 
the auditor. For many clients, the cost of auditing is noteworthy. Although it may be 
easy for large corporations with high sales volume and liquidity or some government 
companies to pay this fee, the cost digit can be very significant for most small 
businesses or those with poor financial standing. Consequently, from the perspective 
of the client, knowing the factors affecting the audit fee, both negotiating and 
bargaining over them and controlling these factors within the organization can 
reduce such costs and make it easier to bear (Nikbakht and Tanani, 2010).  
 
By knowing these factors, auditors can price their services properly. The importance 
of this issue is especially evident in the recent years after the formation of the Iranian 
Society of Official Accountants in our country because after the formation of the 
society, the monopoly of the audit labor market has been broken and fierce 
competition has arisen between auditors, an event that long ago has happened in 
most developed countries. From the early 1970s to the early 2000s, most audit firms 
have focused on their growth rather than on professional values (Zef, 2003).  
 
Audit firm partners have been under tremendous pressure to find new clients, retain 
existing clients, and consulting services. Failing to meet these types of development 
goals in audit firms has had bad consequences, including dismissal. In other words, 
the auditing profession has undergone rapid and significant changes over the last 
twenty years. Declining regulations in the audit labor market allowed audit firms to 
pursue rather economic goals and seek to grow their income and reduce costs in each 
audit job (Healy and Palpo, 2003). On the other hand, investing in different things 
has always been considered as one of the most important ways of developing 
companies and preventing recession and backwardness. In the meantime, resource 
constraints and the rapid growth and transformation of economic relations have led 
to fierce competition in trade, industry, and investment.  
 
Therefore, companies need to make timely investments in order to survive and 
expand their activities or, put it better, to increase their investment efficiency. 
Because capital budgeting decisions determine the strategic direction of the 
company and its long-term effects have undeniable impacts on the financial 
flexibility and market share of the company (Saghafi and Motamedi, 2011; Khodayi 
and Yahyayi, 2010). In general, investment efficiency means accepting projects with 
a positive present net value, and inefficient investment refers to choosing projects 
with a negative present net value (overinvestment) or not choosing investment 
opportunities (insufficient capital) (Saghafi and Motamedi, 2011). Financial distress, 
on the other hand, is a situation where the company is unable to obtain sufficient 
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funding to continue its operations. In the financial literature, it is emphasized that 
companies enter the cycle of financial distress a year prior to bankruptcy and various 
economic events occur in the pre-bankruptcy period (Etemadi et al., 2010).  
 
Financial distress refers to the situation in which companies face difficulties in 
fulfilling their obligations (Baldwin and Mason, 1983), where they are likely to go 
bankrupt (Ohlson, 1980; Shumway, 2001). Previous studies have described financial 
distress as an incentive for managers to engage in profiteering behavior and attempt 
an inappropriate financial report (Hogan et al., 2008). Auditors have access to 
internal information within the company that they use them to assess audit risk that 
is not generally available to the persons outside the organization. Likewise, the 
auditor's fee can be an indicator of the management activities and internal 
information of companies, including financial reporting like voluntary accruals. 
Therefore, in the present research, we try to answer the question that whether there is 
a significant relationship between investment efficiency and audit fees. Does 
financial distress have a significant effect on the relationship between investment 
efficiency and audit fee? 
 
2. Literature Review 
  
2.1 Efficiency of Investment 
 
Investing in different things by companies has always been one of the most 
important ways to develop companies and prevent stagnation and backwardness. In 
the meantime, resource constraints have made it important to increase investment 
efficiency in addition to developing investment. There are at least two theoretical 
criteria for determining investment efficiency.  
 
The first criterion states that there is a need for gathering resources in order to 
finance investment opportunities. In an efficient market, all projects with a positive 
present net value should be financed, although a great deal of researches in the area 
of finance has shown that financial constraints limit managers' ability to finance 
(Hubbard, 1998). One of the things we can infer is that companies facing financing 
constraints may be reluctant to accept and carry out positive present net value 
projects due to the high cost of financing; this leads to reduced investment.  
 
The second criterion also states that if a company decides to finance, there is no 
guarantee that it will make the right investment. For example, by choosing 
inappropriate projects, the managers may invest in inefficient investments for their 
own benefit or even misusing existing resources. Most articles in the field predict 
that poor project selection will increase investment (Stein, 2003). Conceptually, 
investment efficiency is achieved when the company invests only in all projects with 
positive current net value. Of course, this scenario only works if the market is 
complete and there are no flawed market issues, including incorrect selection and 
agency costs (Biddle et al., 2009).  
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In addition, the optimal investment or investment efficiency requires on the one 
hand to prevent the consumption of resources in activities where the investment is 
over-optimized, and on the other, resources are directed to the activities that need 
more investment (Modares and Hesarzadeh, 2008). 
 
2.2 Audit Fee 
 
The auditor's economic interests are provided through fee. Audit fee includes any 
fees paid to the auditor or audit firm on a contractual basis for the provision of audit 
services (by agreement) (Mehrani and Jamshidi, 2011). According to Amani and 
Dawani (2009), "If users of audit reports want to meet their realistic expectations of 
these reports, one of the factors that meet these expectations is the payment of audit 
fee commensurate with the audit services provided. The main dispute of the audit 
profession is to determine the minimum fee for auditing and to break down some of 
the institutions." In fact, the price of any service or commodity is that which 
consumer is willing to pay for it. But in practice, this formula does not work in 
countries without a competitive economy; the monopolies or at least a living wage 
set prices. The existence of low audit fees and, consequently, the poor quality of 
audit services jeopardize the auditing role, resulting in a bias in the presentation of 
contaminated, distorted and inaccurate information that is directly and closely 
associated with the audit fee. However, a comparison of audit fee in different 
countries shows that the audit fee in Iran is much lower than in other countries, 
especially advanced countries. Because in Iran, companies and institutions that use 
audit services are seeking tender for audit fee (Amani and Davani, 2009). 
 
2.3 Financial Distress 
 
Nowadays, one of the most significant risks to many businesses is their inability to 
pay obligations, regardless of the size and nature of their business. The available 
evidence shows that in the last three decades, the bankruptcy rate of firms has grown 
significantly compared to previous decades (Shumway, 2001). An overview of the 
financial situation of Iranian companies also reveals that among the companies listed 
in the Tehran Stock Exchange, there are companies that suffer from many financial 
and operational problems and are in distress in terms of operation, liquidity and 
working capital. Notwithstanding, they continue to operate and consume resources 
that could be invested in profitable and value-creating opportunities. These resources 
are wasted by these companies and reduce the benefits of society (Safarzadeh, 
2009).  
 
Financial distress, as stated above, is a situation in which a company is unable to 
obtain sufficient funding to continue its operations. Researches on the prediction of 
financial distress show that most researchers have considered bankruptcy criteria as 
distress and have predicted it by showing different models. In the financial literature, 
however, it is emphasized that companies enter into a cycle of financial distress 
years before bankruptcy; various economic events occur in the pre-bankruptcy 
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period (Etemadi et al., 2010). Lee and Cheng (2009) believe that companies may 
experience losses and bonds depreciation a year or years before the bankruptcy. 
 
2.4 Research Hypotheses 
 
Karim (2010) examines the pricing of audit services and the type of audit in 
Bangladesh. According to the results of the research, firm size, audit risk and type of 
audit are effective in pricing audit services. Morgan and Stacken (1998) also found 
evidence based on which audit fee increases in parallel with business risk. Simunic 
(1980) also found that audit fee reflects the cost of resources invested in auditing as 
well as the potential losses of future litigation or loss of auditor reputation (audit 
risk) in the future. Dunn and Bradstreet (1998) consider the main cause of 
bankruptcy to be financial and economic problems. Whereas Gitman (1998) believes 
that first and the most important reason for the failure of organizations is their 
mismanagement.  
 
Although the factors of bankruptcy vary from one company to another, several 
common factors can be identified as bankruptcy factors among all bankrupt 
companies. These factors are management incompetence, high cost of production, 
poor financial performance, inactive board (Gerald, 1998). On the other hand, 
according to Fazari et al. (2018) and Althi (2003), investment decisions are largely 
dependent on information asymmetry and agency problems. Information asymmetry 
coupled with market fluctuations, through an impact on external financing, simply 
leads to insufficient investment in companies facing financial constraints.  
 
In this regard, we mention some researches conducted on the relationship between 
the variables of investment efficiency and audit fee and financial distress in the 
following: Gaul et al. (2018) concluded that high managerial ability increased audit 
fee in companies with financial distress as well as reduced audit fee in companies 
without financial distress. Ullah et al. (2018) concluded that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between financial distress and efficiency Investment. 
Vosoughi et al. (2016) concluded that there is a significant relationship between 
financial distress and investment efficiency. Gutierrez et al. (2015) concluded that 
the impact of financial distress on corporate investment varies depending on their 
investment opportunities. Alikhani and Jaberzadeh (2015) concluded that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between financial distress and investment 
efficiency. Salehi et al. (2016) conducted that the companies suffered from financial 
distress with investment opportunities increased their investments in line with 
existing opportunities. Also the findings show that after dividing companies into two 
classes of companies with high and low investment opportunity, it was found that, in 
the sample of stock exchange companies in Iran during the years 2011 to 2018, the 
financially distressed companies increased the level of investment regardless of the 
investment opportunity.  
 
According to the above researches, the hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between investment efficiency and 
audit fee . 
Hypothesis 2: Financial distress has a significant effect on the relationship between 
investment efficiency and audit fee. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
In this research, we will collect empirical data from the financial statements of the 
sample companies, announcements published by the Stock Exchange, by referring to 
Comprehensive Database of Companies on the official website of the Stock 
Exchange using the Rahavard Novin Software. The statistical population of this 
research is the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and all industries active 
during 2011-2018. The sample of this study, with respect to its subject matter, is the 
elimination sampling method, in which the selected companies are subject to the 
following limitations and requirements : 
 
- The company should not be a financial intermediary company. 
- Company shares must be traded during each year of the research period. 
- In terms of comparability, the company's end of the financial year must be 
the end of March . 
- Not any change in their financial performaane or operating activity during 
the study period. 
- The company should be listed in the Stock Exchange from the beginning to 
the end of the research period. 
- All the data required must be available during the period 2011-2018 . 
 
Taking into account the above conditions, there are 141 companies that represent the 
actual statistical population under consideration. Therefore, using the multivariate 
regression statistical method, the research hypotheses presented in the previous 
section have been investigated. The research hypotheses were also tested using 
software R as presented in the following sections . 
 
3.1 Research Variables and their Measurement 
 
A. Independent variable: 
INV_EFF: Richardson pattern (2006) has been used in this model to calculate 
corporate investment efficiency. The Richardson pattern is as follows: 
 
Invi,t = β0 + β1 Grow i, t-1 + ΣФj Control j,t,t-1+ ν i,t 
 
Where : 
Invi, t: is a change in net fixed assets and is calculated as Long-term investments and 
intangible assets divided by the average total of the assets of the company i in year t ; 
Growi, t-1: Growth rate of annual sales revenue of company i in year t-1; 
Control j, t, t-1: is a control dummy variable of j in t and t-1; 
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Levi, t-1: Financial leverage of Company i in year t-1 (ratio of total debts to total 
assets); 
Agei, t-1: Age of company i in year t-1; 
Cashi, t-1: Cash ratio (cash plus short-term investments divided by average assets in 
year t-1) ; 
Sizei, t-1: Company size (natural logarithm of total assets of year t-1); 
Reti, t-1: The annual return on shares of company i in year t-1; 
Lag (Invi, t-1): Investment time interval. 
 
According to Richardson's research (2006), sales are used as a variable to estimate 
expected investment opportunities. According to this approach, investment is a 
function of the growth opportunities measured by sales. The model argues that the 
firm's sales volume reflects the expectation of a firm's investment in an efficient 
market. By placing the calculated digit for the total investment in the above 
regression equation, the residuals of this equation are calculated. Positive residuals 
(positive deviation from expected investment) represent projects with a negative net 
present value or overinvestment, and negative residuals (negative deviation from 
expected investment) indicate the passage of investment opportunities with the net 
positive current value, or indeed the insufficient investment. The absolute value of 
the residuals is the regression equation as an inverse indicator of investment 
efficiency i.e investment inefficiency. 
 
B. Dependent variable: 
Ln_AF: The natural logarithm of the audit fee. 
 
C. Adjusting variable: 
DISTRS: a two-part variable that is used to identify distressed companies based on 
the Altman Z' model. In this research, the Z' Altman model, which, according to the 
research of Haji et al. (2010), is calculated by the following relation: 
 
Z = 3/20784 K1 +1/80384 K2 +1/61363 K3+0/50094 K4 +0/16903 K5 -0/39709 K6 -
0/12505 K7 +0/33849 K8 +1/42363 K9 : 
 
Where: 
Z': Financial crisis in the company; 
K1: Profit ratio before interest and tax on assets; 
K2: Ratio of Accumulated Earning to Assets;  
K3: Ratio of working capital to assets; 
K4: Ratio of Equity to Debts;  
K5: Ratio of Profit before interest and tax on sales; 
K6: Ratio of Current assets-to-debt;  
K7: Ratio of net profit to sales;  
K8: Ratio of Debts to Assets;  
K9: Company size; 
Cutoff = 15.8907; 
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If P <15.8907, then the company is in a financial crisis . ;  
If P> =15.8907, then the company is without a financial crisis . 
 
The cut-off point of the companies with the financial crisis from those without it in 
the model is 15.8907; it has been calculated using linear discriminant analysis. This 
point is calculated to provide the best classification for firms with and without a 
financial crisis. If P of the company is less than 15.8907, it is coded as a company 
with financial crisis and code 1 and if P is greater than or equal to 15.8907, it is 
coded as a company without financial crisis and code 0. 
 
D. Control variables: 
Ln_SIZE: the natural logarithm of total asset . 
FOREIGN: the ratio of export to total sales . 
INVREC: the ratio of total inventory and accounts receivable to total assets . 
LOSS: a two-part variable that is coded as one if the company has had a loss in one 
of the past 3 years . 
LEV: financial leverage that is calculated through the ratio of total debts to total 
assets . 
ROA: the rate of return on assets and is calculated as the ratio of net profit to total 
assets . 
QUICK: The ratio of total current assets minus inventories to total current debts . 
SGROWTH: growth rate; change of annual percentage in sales . 
EQ: The accruals quality based on the Dichev & Dichoo (2002) model as modified 
by Nicholas (2002) and is calculated as the residual 5-year standard deviation of the 
company's accruals regression. 
 
The Dichev and Dichoo Model (2002): 
 
WCt= b0+b1×CFOt-1+b2×CFOt+b3×CFOt+1+t 
 
In the model above : 
ΔWCt: Working capital changes; 
CFOt-1: Operating Cash for the year before; 
CFOt: Current year operating cash flow; 
CFOt + 1: Operating Cash of Next Year; 
εt: Model residuals or error; 
A_SIZE: a two-part variable that is coded 1 if the company is handled by the audit 
organization . 
SPECIALIST: auditor's industry expertise is equal to one when the auditor is an 
industry specialist; otherwise, it is zero. In this research, we use a market share 
approach to measure the expertise of auditors in the relevant industry. The greater 
the market share of the auditor, the greater the expertise and experience of the 
auditor than other competitors. Having a dominant market share indicates that the 
auditor has successfully distinguished itself from other competitors in terms of audit 
quality. Auditors' market share is calculated as follows (Palmers, 1986): 
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Total assets of all the owners of any particular audit firm in a particular industry/ 
total assets of all owners in this industry; 
Institutions in this research are considered to be industry experts whose market share 
(i.e. the above equation) is greater than [1.x (available firms in an industry / 1)]. 
Therefore, in the present research, if the auditor is an industry expert, 1 is used as 
code otherwise zero ; 
Ln_ATENURE: the natural logarithm of the auditor's tenure . 
AOPINION: a two-part variable that is coded with 1 if the auditor's comment is 
acceptable, otherwise is zero. 
INSTO: The total percentage of shares held by companies (banks, insurance, 
retirement and investment) owned by institutional shareholders . 
IND_EFFECT: the constant influence of the industry . 
YEAR_EFFECT: fixed effects of the year . 
 
To test the first and second hypotheses of the research, the following model derived 
from the researches done by Gaul et al. (2018) is used: 
 
Ln_AFi,t= α +β1 INV_EFFi,t+β2DISTRSi,t +β3INV_EFF ×DISTRSi,t+β4Ln_SIZEi,t+ 
β5FOREIGNi,t 
+β6INVRECi,t+β7ROAi,t+β8LOSSi,t+β9LEVi,t+β10QUICKi+β11SGROWTHi,t+β12EQi,t
+β13A_SIZEi,t+β14SPECIALISTi,t + β15Ln_ATENUREi,t + β16AOPINIONi,t + 
β17INSTOi,t + IND_EFFECT + YEAR_EFFECT + ɛ  
(Regression model of the first and second hypotheses) 
 
4. Findings 
 
This section deals with descriptive and inferential statistics related to the analysis of 
research data . 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Summary of the descriptive statistics for the model variables is as described in Table 
(1): 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of research variables 
Research continuous variables 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
Auditor's fee AF 6.689 6.649 8.641 5.162 0.744 
Investment 
efficiency INV_EFF -0.001 -0.025 0.344 -0.112 0.086 
Company size SIZE 13.854 13.723 18.389 10.977 1.354 
Exports FOREIGN 0.128 0.015 1.000 0.000 0.239 
Inventory of 
goods and 
accounts 
INVREC 0.529 0/537 0/889 0.099 0.194 
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receivable 
Return on 
assets 
ROA 0.120 0.106 0.555 -0.242 0.141 
Lever LEV 0.604 0.614 1/229 0.140 0.205 
Fast ratio QUICK 0.896 0.793 3/655 0.139 0.566 
Sales growth SGROWTH 0.199 1.152 2.230 -0.487 0.388 
Quality of 
benefit 
EQ 0.086 0/065 0/420 0.001 0.081 
CEO tenure 
Logarithm 
Ln_ATENU
RE 
0.367 0.000 1/609 0.000 0.482 
Institutional 
owners 
INSTO 0.604 0.704 0.981 0.000 0.316 
Research artificial variables 
Variable Symbol Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number 1 Frequency 
percentage 
number 1 
Number 0 
Auditor Size A_SIZE 0.236 0.425 146 23% 473 
Financial 
Distress 
DISTRS 0.034 0.181 21 3% 598 
Loss LOSS 0.187 0/391 116 18% 503 
Auditor's 
comment 
AOPINION 0.496 0/500 307 49% 312 
Expertise in 
the auditor 
industry 
 
SPECIALIS
T 
0.394 0.489 244 39% 375 
Source: Research findings. 
 
The main central index is the mean, which represents the equilibrium point and the 
center of gravity of the distribution, and is a good index to indicate the centrality of 
the data; the standard deviation also is one of the most important parameters of the 
dispersion and a criterion for the dispersion of the observations of the mean. 
According to the results of the table above, the mean variable of auditor's fee is 
6.689; it indicates that most of the data is concentrated around this point, and its 
standard deviation is 0.744. In other words, the standard deviation shows that the 
average dispersion of the auditor's fees is around 0.744. 
 
4.2 Testing Classical Regression Assumptions  
 
In order to estimate the parameters of regression models, the test of the classical 
regression assumption is of great importance. The most important of these 
assumptions are the assumptions about the normality of the model residuals, the lack 
of self-correlation, the lack of collinearity and the lack of heterogeneity of variance 
between the model residuals. The Jarque-Bra test was used to check the normality of 
residuals. The results of this test show that the residual of the models under study 
has a normal distribution. The Durbin-Watson statistic was used to detect the self-
correlation between residuals. The results show that the Durbin-Watson statistic for 
the first hypothesis is 1.963 and for the second hypothesis is 1.978; they are in the 
range of 1.5 to 2.5 and confirm the absence of first-order self-correlation. The test of 
 Investment Efficiency and Audit Fee from the Perspective of the Role of Financial Distress 
 
                                                                                                                                  328  
 
 
the variance inflation factor was used to evaluate the collinearity. The results of this 
test show that the variance inflation of the independent and control variables of the 
research models is appropriate and therefore, there is no problem in this regard. In 
order to investigate the presence of homogeneity variance among the residuals, the 
White test was used. The results of this test showed that the null hypothesis is 
accepted, based on which there is a homogeneity of variance in the research model . 
 
4.3 Chow (F Limer) Test, Hausman Test 
 
The nature of the model data for the first hypothesis of the research is of a 
combinatorial data type; so to determine whether the panel data method would be 
efficient in estimating the model in question, we use the F-Limer test. Now, for 
determining which method (fixed effects or random effects) is more appropriate to 
estimate, we use the Hausman test. The results of these tests have been presented in 
Table (2) . 
 
Table 2. Results of the F-Limer, Hausman test 
Hypothesis Test name Statistic χ2 Significance level Result 
First Chow 034/748 0/000 Panel Preference 
Hausman 907/99 0/000 Fixed effects 
preference 
Second Chow 324/758 0/000 Panel Preference 
Hausman 783/111 0/000 Fixed effects 
preference 
Source: Research findings. 
 
According to the results of Table (2) and since the significance level of the chow test 
is less than 0.05, the panel estimation model is, therefore, more preferable to the 
combinatorial model estimation. Also, according to the Hausman test, which has a 
significance level less than 0.05, fixed effects are preferred over random effects. 
Consequently, the panel method with fixed effects is used to estimate this model. 
 
4.4 Inferential Statistics 
 
4.4.1 Testing the first hypothesis 
Since all classical regression assumptions are the case, we can rely on the results. 
The results of the estimation of the research model have been presented in Table (3). 
According to the results of Table (3), we can see that the F statistic has a value of 
19.837 and its significance is less than 0.05. As a result, the whole regression model 
is accepted; this means that there is a significant relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable and at least one independent 
variable has a significant relationship with the dependent variable . 
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Table 3. The results of the first hypothesis test 
Title Symbol Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Statistic t Significance VIF 
y-intercept Β0 2.927 0.881 3.321 0.001  
Investment 
efficiency INVEFF -1.789 0.627 -2.853 0.005 1.828 
size of the 
company SIZE 0.253 0.062 4.057 0.000 1.454 
Exports FOREIGN 0.064 0.096 0.668 0.505 1.169 
Inventory 
of goods 
and 
accounts 
receivable INVREC -0.045 0.107 -0.416 0.678 1.193 
Return on 
assets ROA 0.009 0.213 0.040 0.968 2.389 
Loss LOSS -0.056 0.050 -1.140 0.255 1.340 
Lever LEV 0.064 0.176 0.367 0.714 2.116 
Fast ratio QUICK -0.144 0.046 -3.123 0.002 1.390 
Sales 
growth SGROWTH 0.118 0.040 2.990 0.003 1.628 
Quality of 
benefit EQ 0.062 0.204 0.305 0.760 1.239 
Auditor 
Size ASIZE 0.403 0.105 3.856 0.000 1.124 
Expertise in 
the auditor 
industry 
SPEC 0.119 0.049 2.427 0.016 1.265 
CEO tenure 
Logarithm LNTENURE 0.031 0.029 1.077 0.282 1.249 
Auditor's 
comment OPINION 0.089 0.041 2.194 0.029 1.107 
Institutional 
owners INSTO 0.030 0.151 0.199 0.842 1.400 
F statistic F signif Model R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
19.837 0.000 0.874 0.830 1.963 
Source: Research findings. 
 
According to the results of Table (3), the coefficient of investment efficiency 
variable has a negative value of -1.789 and the t-statistic for it is -2.853. Since the 
significance level of this statistic is less than 0.05, there can be a significant 
relationship between investment efficiency and audit fee. In other words, there is a 
significant relationship between investment efficiency and audit fee. As a result, the 
first hypothesis of the research is accepted . 
 
4.4.2 Testing the second hypothesis 
Since all classical regression assumptions are the case here, we can rely upon the 
results. The results of the estimation of the research model have been presented in 
Table 4. According to the results of Table (4), we can see that the F statistic has a 
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value of 19.827 and its significance is less than 0.05. As a result, the whole 
regression model is accepted; this means that there is a significant relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable and at least one 
independent variable has a significant relationship with the dependent variable . 
 
Table 4. Results of the test of research second hypothesis 
Title Symbol Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Statistic 
t 
Significance VIF 
y-intercept Β0 3.037 0.863 3.521 0.001  
Investment 
efficiency 
INVEFF 
-1.944 0.639 -3.041 0.003 2.160 
Financial 
distress 
DIST 
-0.174 0.118 -1.476 0.141 1.489 
Investment 
performanc
e × distress 
INVEFF× 
DIST 
3.710 1.303 2.848 0.005 1.403 
Size of the 
company 
SIZE 
0.250 0.061 4.106 0.000 1.236 
Exports FOREIGN 0.062 0.097 0.641 0.522 1.166 
Inventory of 
goods and 
accounts 
receivable 
INVREC 
-0.065 0.106 -0.609 0.543 1.344 
Return on 
assets 
ROA 
-0.102 0.214 -0.477 0.633 2.248 
Loss LOSS -0.050 0.050 -0.006 0.315 1.311 
Lever LEV 0.002 0.171 0.009 0.993 2.321 
Fast ratio QUICK -0.146 0.044 -3.293 0.001 1.627 
Sales 
growth 
SGROWTH 
0.121 0.041 2.979 0.003 1.414 
Quality of 
benefit 
EQ 
0.056 0.200 0.282 0.778 1.377 
Auditor 
Size 
ASIZE 
0.402 0.104 3.869 0.000 1.134 
Expertise in 
the auditor 
industry 
SPEC 
0.121 0.049 2.447 0.015 1.223 
CEO tenure 
Logarithm 
LNTENURE 
0.035 0.029 1.205 0.229 1.262 
Auditor's 
comment 
OPINION 
0.089 0.041 2.202 0.028 1.102 
Institutional 
owners 
INSTO 
0.034 0.149 0.226 0.821 1.389 
F statistic F signif Model R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
19.827 0.000 0.876 0.832 1.978 
Source: Research findings. 
 
According to the results of Table (4), the coefficient of interaction between 
investment efficiency and distress has a positive value of 3.710 and the t-statistic is 
2.848. Since the significance level of this statistic is less than 0.05, there can be a 
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positive and significant effect of distress on the relationship between investment 
efficiency and audit fee. In other words, financial distress has a significant positive 
effect on the relationship between investment efficiency and auditor's fee. As a 
result, the second hypothesis of the research is accepted. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Based on the first hypothesis, we expected that there would be a significant 
relationship between investment efficiency and audit fee. The results of this 
hypothesis are that managers working in Iran have greater confidence than the firms 
that use auditor in their companies who receives less audit fee. In general, the results 
show that the investment efficiency coefficient is negative, indicating a negative 
impact of investment efficiency on audit fee, which is significant. In view of the 
above, the first hypothesis of the research is confirmed. So, there is an inverse 
relationship between investment efficiency and audit fee. The test results of this 
hypothesis are in accordance with the results of the research of Gaul et al. (2018). 
 
Based on the second hypothesis, we expected that financial distress has a significant 
effect on the relationship between investment efficiency and audit fee. Companies in 
a climate of financial distress have overconfident managers. In general, the results 
show that the interactive effect coefficient is positive; this indicates a positive effect 
of financial distress on the relationship between investment efficiency and audit fee, 
which is significant at the significant level. In view of the above, the second 
hypothesis of the research is confirmed. Thus, when there is a variable of financial 
distress, the relationship between investment efficiency and auditor's fee is 
strengthened. The test results of this hypothesis are in accordance with the results of 
the research of Gaul et al. (2018), Ulah et al. (2018), Vosoughi et al. (2016), 
Gutiérrez et al. (2015). 
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